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Disclaimer: This report captures the substance of discussions over two days, research studies and reflection papers. The views 
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.

vThe World Food Programme (WFP) convened a two-day conference on 
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies in June 2009, 
inviting United Nations officials, academics, thinkers and practitioners to join 
senior staff and country directors and consider how WFP can meet the needs 
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 WFP Deputy Chief Operating Officer and Director of Emergencies
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1Executive Summary and Recommendations1
The conference on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies 
generated two days of rich discussions, culminating in a set of actionable steps 
and ways forward.1 This summary outlines the thematic debates and gives an 
overview of the main recommendations.2 
1 The conference was held under Chatham House rules: the report therefore does not ascribe opinions or statements to 
individual participants. 
2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP. 
executive summary and Recommendations
1 The conference was held under Chatham House rules: the 
report therefore does not ascribe opinions or statements to 
individual participants.
2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.









































































































































Challenges of Humanitarian Action in Conflicts and  
Complex Emergencies3
3 This section summarizes the three thematic presentations of the conference and the plenary discussions that followed. The 
themes, presenters and panellists can be found in the conference agenda on page 135. 


































































3 This section summarizes the three thematic presentations 
of the conference and the plenary discussions that followed. 
The themes, presenters and panellists can be found in the 
conference agenda on page 135.
4 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
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Applying Humanitarian Principles: 




































Applying Humanitarian Principles: 

















































































































































































































Critical Areas of Engagement: 
Proposed Tools and Strategies 
in the Face of New Challenges 






















































































































































Engaging State and Non-State Actors 



































































































































































Recommendations for WFP Emerging 
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WfP’s Work in Complex emergencies and on-Going 
Conflicts: a Discussion note 
The purpose of this note is to frame the debate on the World Food Programme’s 
strategic priorities and investments for more effective engagement in conflict situ-
ations. Drawing on a set of case studies on the role of WFP in complex humanitar-
ian crises,5 the note highlights some of the current problematic areas of opera-
tions and programming with a view to outlining the possible short and long-term 
consequences of WFP’s strategy.6
5 Thomas Gurtner and Catherine Bellamy consultants for WFP, drafted this note based on a literature review of WFP policies, 
needs assessments, targeting and key evaluation reports, and a set of reflection papers and research studies on Afghanistan, 
Sudan (Darfur), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Somalia and Sri Lanka conducted in March to June 2009. 
6 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
5 Thomas Gurtner and Catherine Bellamy consultants for WFP, 
drafted this note based on a literature review of WFP policies, 
needs assessments, targeting and key evaluation reports, and 
a set of reflection papers and research studies on Afghanistan, 
Sudan (Darfur), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, 
Somalia and Sri Lanka conducted in March to June 2009.
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7 WFP Strategic Plan (2008 — 2001). WFP/EB.A/2008/5-A/1/



































































































































































































































8 James Darcy, Stephen Anderson and Nisar Majid A Review 
of the Links between Needs Assessment and Decision-Making 
in Response to Food Crises Study undertaken for the World 
Food Programme under the SENAC project, 2007. 
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Trends In Conflict and Humanitarian assistance:
a Review of literature, Policy and Practice
Undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group, overseas Development Institute
Introduction
This paper represents a summary of a review of trends in conflict and humanitarian 
assistance undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI on behalf of the 
UN World Food Programme, in preparation for the conference “Humanitarian as-
sistance in conflict and complex emergencies” held in Rome, 24 -25th June 2009. 
The review was based primarily on literature and recent research, with a focus on 
humanitarian policy trends and implications.9
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Figure 1: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 1964–2003
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Trends in International 
Engagement in Conflict and 
Protracted Crisis Situations
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Protection of Civilians and the 
Pursuit of Justice




















































Human Rights and Protection: Balancing 























































































































Humanitarian and Development 
























New Types of Relief, Livelihood 


































































































































































































































level	institutions	(e .g .	local	government) .
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Figure 4: Absolute Numbers of Aid Worker Attacks — 























































































































Figure 5: Highest Incident Countries, 2006-2008
Source:	Stoddard,	Harmer	and	DeDominici	(2009)
Countries with most aid worker attacks
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Emerging Threats and Potential 
Causes of Future Conflict





















































Youth Radicalisation, Political Islam and 





































































Figure 6: Historic and Projected Trends for  





















































































































































































































































Implications of Conflict Trends  
for WFP






























































































ers:	WFP will continuously assess and align its 
approaches to changes in the external operat-
ing and funding environments, and develop 
its range of tools in order to meet hunger and 
humanitarian needs in ways that are as sensi-
tive as possible to local conditions, for ex-
ample by using vouchers and cash when ap-
propriate, as an alternative or addition to food 
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Compromise or Capitulation: Report on WfP 
and the Humanitarian Crisis in sri lanka
David Keen, london school of economics10 
10 2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP. 
Case study: sri lanka (Field visit, April 2009)
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Introduction
A major humanitarian disaster has been unfolding in Sri Lanka. The message in 
official pronouncements and most of the national press is that this is a disaster that 
the government has been trying to ameliorate. Defence Minister Gotabaya Raja-
pakse described the situation as “the world’s biggest hostage rescue operation.”11 
Sri Lankan officials have described the government’s military push as a “humanitar-
ian” operation. Simultaneously, it has been presented as part of a war on terrorism. 
With the military defeat of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], according to 
the Sri Lankan government, “The President’s dream of creating an environment in 
which all citizens can live in harmony and liberty is now being realised.”12
11 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily News, 21 April 2009.




















13  UN Human Rights Council, adopted text, 
























14 See, for example, David Keen, 2005, Conflict and 
Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey.
10 The views expre sed do not necessarily reflect those of 
WFP.
11 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily 
News, 21 April 2009.
12 ITN News, UK, April 26 2009.
13 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily 
News, 21 April 2009.















… the LTTE has brutally and systemati-
cally abused the Tamil population on 
whose behalf they claim to fight… the 
LTTE bears a heavy responsibility for 
the desperate plight of the civilians in 
the Vanni17… The LTTE has frequently 
targeted civilians with bombs and 
remote-controlled landmines, killed 
perceived political opponents includ-
ing many Tamil politicians, journalists, 
and members of rival organizations, 
and has forcibly recruited Tamils into its 









15 I use the word children here to mean those under 18.
16 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Trapped and Mistreated: 
LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni,” December, p. 3). 
Internally displaced people reported LTTE recruiting children 
as young as 12, and sometimes four or five from the same 
family (BBC, 6 April 2009, in IDMC [International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict 
facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009. p. 10).
17 This is sometimes written as “Wanni.”
18 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Trapped and Mistreated: 








































19 For example, Mark Duffield, 1994. “The Political 
Economy of Internal War,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony 
Zwi, (eds.) War and Hunger: Rethinking International 
Responses to Complex Emergencies. London: Zed Books 
and Save the Children, UK; David Keen, 2008, The Benefits 
of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in 
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first 
published, 1994, Princeton University Press).
20 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 
1996, Copenhagen: Danida.









































21 David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political 
Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-
89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton 
University Press). 
22 David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra 










































23 I discuss these dynamics at greater length in: David Keen, 
2005, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine 
and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James 
Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press); 
David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 
Oxford: James Currey; David Keen, 2006, Endless War: 
Hidden Functions of the “War on Terror”; and David Keen, 
2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.

















































































WFP was the only organisation still 
useful for the people of the Vanni in 
24 Some interviewees said the camps had numerous 
paramilitaries. The International Crisis Group noted that 
killings and disappearances in Eastern Province have 
apparently been committed by government security 
forces and/or their allies in the anti-LTTE Tamil Makkal 
Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) (International Crisis Group, 2009, 
“Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons 
from the Eastern Province,” April 16).
25 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, 
2009, “Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 
update,” HPG Policy Brief 34, ODI, London, April.
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November-December-January [2008-
9]. It was the only UN organisation still 
doing something in the Vanni… WFP 
was sending food on convoys and now 
[that is, April 2009] they’re sending 
food to the no fire zone. They’ve been 





































26 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment,” 







































27 One local NGO worker said other agencies circulate a 
hard copy of previous minutes before the meeting, adding 
that WFP only circulated these at the meeting itself. The 
result, he said, was that senior management of other aid 
agencies do not get a chance to prepare any follow-up to the 
previous meeting.
28 Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 
10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, 
agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 9. There were some delays 
in delivery of locally purchased rice (WFP, “Standard Project 
Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1,” n.p.).











































29 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.
















































WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 55
Analytical Narrative
Government Manipulation of Relief and 







































31 WFP, 2007, “WFP Sri Lanka: Food Assistance for Protection 
and Peace-Building,” 18-23 March, p. 11.
32 See, notably, Nicholas Crawford, “Sri Lanka: Principles and 





































33 During Nigeria’s civil war in 1967-70, the Nigerian 
government tried to starve out the Biafran rebels; partly to 
secure relief and partly for military reasons, the rebel Biafran 
administration mixed relief flights with those bringing in 
military supplies and insisted on night-flights to impede 
Nigerian government interceptions (see, for example, John 
Stremlau, 1977, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil 
War, 1967-1970, Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress; Dan 
Jacobs, 1987, The Brutality of Nations. New York: Knopf. 
34 David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political 
Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-
89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton 
University Press). 




































35 A good example is Operation Lifeline Sudan in the 1990s.
36 Mark Cutts, 1999, The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 
1992–95: The Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access, 
Working Paper 8, New Issues in Refugee Research, Geneva: 
UNHCR.
37 Alex de Waal, 1997, Famine Crimes: Politics and the 
Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: James Currey. See 
also Ataul Karim, Mark Duffield et al., 1996. “OLS: Operation 
Lifeline — a Review.” Geneva: Department for Humanitarian 
Affairs, July. Human Rights Watch, 1999, “Famine in Sudan, 
1998” The Human Rights Causes; Marc Lavergne and Fabrice 
Weissman (eds.), 2004, In the Shadow of “Just Wars”: 










































Shortage of Relief for the Vanni from 







































Our assistance reached the people 
with great difficulty. It needed approval 
38 WFP, 2007, “WFP Sri Lanka: Food Assistance for Protection 
and Peace-Building,” 18-23 March, p. 3.
39 Calculations from monthly figures in WFP records. 
Mother-and-child nutrition programmes for Mullaitivu district 
were very badly hit in the period April-July 2006 (WFP, 2006, 
“Emergency Food Security Assessment,” Vanni, Sri Lanka, 
October, p. 10.)
40 Interview with WFP worker. See also WFP Sri Lanka, 
“Special Operation SP 10539.0, Augmentation of logistics 
preparedness capacity,” 1 September 2006-31 January 2007, 
p. 3.
from the Ministry of Defence, especially 
after August 2006. So we couldn’t get 
the approved amount of food for our 
beneficiaries — IDPs, food-for-work, 
school feeding, and mother and child 
nutrition. We couldn’t get sufficient 
food for these. The increasing fuel 

























41 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 2.
42 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.
43 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, 
Sri Lanka, October, p. 12.
44 World Food Programme, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security 
Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and 
Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June 
(p. 39).
45 Newsweek, 16 October 2008, in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 7.
46 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 7.






































47 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 1.
48 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 
10067.1,” n.p.
49 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.
50 WFP, “Hunger’s global hotspots,” 25 May 2007.
51 WFP, “Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 
10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda 













Some Government Concerns in Relation 






























52 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 2.






All organisations had to depend on 
local staff. Some of the local staff 
employed by the majority of organisa-
tions were recommended by the LTTE. 
We had a problem identifying their 
neutrality. We don’t know if they gave 
them [the LTTE] a percentage of their 
salaries or whatever. We have no way of 
monitoring anything happening on that 
side. We’re finding stuff buried now all 
over the conflict zone… There’s a worry 





















Here, WFP brings in food and hands 
over to the government. As the conflict 
has changed, the government’s rela-
tionship with WFP has become more 
political. The government see the food 
as theirs, and being able to direct where 
the food goes. As NGOs, we have very 
little to do with WFP in Sri Lanka.
One	WFP	worker	noted:	
When we came to this country, back in 
1968, it was a development problem. 
When we came in the Tsunami emer-
gency [from December 2004], we were 
using the government as our partner 
only. In other countries, we have solidly 
relied on NGOs. [But here] convoys’ 
food was handed over to the Addition-
al Government Authority (AGA) who 
remained behind. We take food to the 
nearest government warehouse and 





























53 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 4-5.







The continued working through Govern-
ment structures will require considera-
ble effort and initiative to ensure appro-
priate standards of delivery but, if suc-
cessful, will allow for better access and 
a greater, more integrated response 
capacity than working independently. 
Eventually maintaining this approach 
should also allow WFP to cease food 





















There was a push on the east side of 
the country from March 2008. The idea 
was to close the LTTE in Mullativu. 
When the offensive came to Kilinoc-
hchi, so at that point the government 
54 WFP PRRO Concept Paper for 2008 .
55 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 3.
says we will have to use massive force. 
They came to us and said we can no 
longer provide security assistance, 
you need to go out. The LTTE tried to 
secure Kilinochchi, now it’s completely 
destroyed… When the government 
entered, a lot of civilians were pushed 
by the LTTE to retreat. Surprising eve-























The LTTE organised demonstrations 
that wouldn’t let us leave. We were 
stuck. There were nine UN internation-
als and two from international NGOs 
and local staff, a terrible situation. It 
was obvious we had to leave. It was 
always about getting permission to 
leave from the LTTE. The solution came 
from thanking the LTTE for their coming 
solution, showing them to be in control, 
so it would have been difficult to stop 
us. We were 15-20 minutes delayed 
56 See also WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Project 10067.1.”
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when the LTTE were messing with us. 
Then there was a great air strike, three 
bombs on the road where we were sup-
posed to be! So a guarantee here is not 
a guarantee. [The air strike here would 





































57 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 11.
Seven large UN food convoys were dis-
patched to the Vanni between October 
2, 2008, and December 15, 2008, car-
rying a combined load of 4,120 metric 
tons of food (another food convoy is 
scheduled for December 18)… The UN 
World Food Program (WFP) and the 
government estimate that at least 750 
metric tons per week are needed to 
meet the minimum nutritional require-
ment of the displaced population in 
the Vanni… Even the 750 metric tons 
is an underestimate, since the basic 
minimum WFP rations per person of 0.5 
kilograms [cereals, pulses, oil, sugar] for 
230,000 persons (the smallest credible 
estimate of the displaced population) 
would require a total of 805 metric 
tons per week, or 3,450 metric tons per 
month. Based on this formula, the IDP 
population of the Vanni would require 
a total of at least 10,250 metric tons of 
food for the three months between the 
withdrawal of the UN on September 16, 
2008, and the time of the finalization 
of this report, December 15. However, 
the seven food convoys combined only 
delivered a total of 4,120 metric tons 
of food, a shortfall of 6,230 metric tons 
of food over the minimum nutrition 
requirements of the displaced (p. 27) 
population... As a result, a very large 
gap exists between the minimum daily 
requirements of the population and the 
food being brought into the Vanni. Ac-
cording to humanitarian officials, some 
of the camps they work in are already 
down to distributing just two meals per 
day, and one camp is reportedly surviv-
ing on just one meal a day.” (pp. 27-28).58 
A	3	October	2008	WFP	press	release	not-
ed,	“WFP	plans	to	send	a	minimum	of	one	aid	
58 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December. 






























59 WFP News Release, “First WFP food convoy of 2009 
reaches the Vanni region,” 9 January 2009, Rome.
60 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 40. By “conservative estimates,” they meant 
the estimate of 230,000 displaced. Human Rights Watch 
noted, “There are an estimated 230,000 to 300,000 displaced 
persons currently trapped in the Vanni conflict zone, as well as 
a small number of Vanni residents who remain in their homes.” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 25). While UNHCR put the number of displaced 
in the Vanni at 230,000 in November 2008, a UN interagency 
assessment mission of October 17-18 2008 put the number at 
300,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, 
and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni 
Region,” December, pp. 23-24). The figure of 230,000 was 
mentioned by the UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian 
Coordinator (“Press release: UN convoy delivers food to Vanni 
civilians,” 18 October 2008). WFP noted in October 2008 that 
the organisation “has dispatched a first convoy of food and 
other supplies for 200,000 displaced people in the LTTE-
controlled area of Sri Lanka.” (WFP News Release, “First food 
aid convoy reaches thousands of displaced in northern Sri 


























61 An October 2008 WFP report observed, “WFP emergency 
food security assessments (EFSAs) in LTTE-controlled Vanni 
in October 2006, Jaffna in November 2006, Batticaloa in 
May 2007 and Trincomalee in July 2007 all indicate similar 
effects of conflict on IDPs, host families and non-displaced 
households…” (WFP, Protracted Relief and Recovery 
Operation, Sri Lanka 10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive 
Board Approval, agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 6). In 
a June 2007 report, WFP noted, “Besides the internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) are an increasing proportion of the 
general population across a number of areas in the North and 
East that are affected by the conflict” (WFP, 2007, “Sri Lanka 
Food Security Assessment,” based on the Integrated Food 
Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final 
report, June, p. 37). 
62 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February.
63 Human Rights Watch noted, “The government is also 
sending in additional convoys of non-UN food through 
Government Agents, but the food on those convoys is 
destined partly to be sold at (28) the government-organised 
Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society (MPSC) stores, and not 
for free distribution to displaced persons.” Many displaced 
people did not have the money to buy the food. The Indian 
government contributed 1,700 tons of humanitarian assistance 
(including food, clothing and hygiene items) in late November 
(distributed by ICRC) (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, 
Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s 
Vanni Region,” December, pp. 28-9).








It is in the non-food sectors that the 
impact of the ordered withdrawal has 
been felt most severely; it is these 
sectors that are not included in the 
permitted UN shipments ino the Vanni 
and which are most impacted by the 
absence of qualified humanitarian per-
sonnel on the ground. The provision 
of basic assistance to IDPs in the Vanni 
is made more complicated by the fact 
that many families have had to move 
multiple times to escape approaching 
fighting. Each time, new shelters and 
sanitation facilities need to be con-















The great majority of non-food items 
were not allowed. There was a lot of 
negotiation to add other items and it 
was delaying departure and distribu-
tion. There were jealousies of WFP be-
64 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 25.
ing in the frontline and other agencies 
not. The Humanitarian Coordinator 
was under pressure from other agen-
cies that were not seen to be doing 
something for the people. If UNHCR 
wants to get shelter, it has to go and 
get permissions [from the government] 
separately, and UNICEF for water and 
sanitation and education materials. At 
times permission comes from Colombo 












With WatSan [water and sanitation], 
the amount going in for two years was 
negligible. What was going in was on 
the GA [Government Authority] con-
voys. There were more and more IDPs 
over time with the [military] push. We 
were never allowed to take water tanks 
and pipes in any significant quantities, 
and it was deliberate. They [the peo-
ple in the north] were supposed to 










65 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, 
Sri Lanka, October, p. 32.








There was strong pressure. At a De-
cember 12 [2008] meeting, I said 
that [coming] convoy was screwed… 
When WFP was ordered to leave PTK 
[Puthukkudiyiruppu] and go to the no 
fire zone, it was supposed to draw peo-
ple there. The convoy ended up in the 
no fire zone getting shelled to shit, and 
the strategy didn’t work because the 
LTTE was putting their own people into 






No army wants enemies behind their 
lines. People were pushed east to west. 
It was both the army and the LTTE, a 
combination of the army and LTTE not 
letting people go through their lines. 
If you get through the LTTE, then you 
have to go through the army. During 
convoy number 1, to Mullaitivu and 
PTK [Puthukkudiyiruppu], the second to 
third of October, I saw empty vehicles 
going east to west and full vehicles 




















The January 16 [2009] convoy, we 
left here around 10 am and reached 
about 60 kilometres from here. We 
were not allowed to use the A9 [main 
road], I think the military wanted to 
use it. They wanted us to use a dirt 
road. From Puliyankulam, we had to 
use a dirt road. At Ouddusuddan, 
the convoy branched into two, one 
to Mullyavallai and the other to PTK 
[Puthukkudiyiruppu] and then Thar-
mapuram, delivering food. We were 
trapped at PTK. There was fighting 
going on all around. The LTTE were 
firing over the warehouses and the 
military firing back to other ware-
houses. The government was arguing 
that they will lose military advantage if 
they have to make way for the convoy.
He	explained	the	manipulation	of	the	con-
voy	in	more	detail:	
The SLA [Sri Lankan army] wants to fol-
low the convoy and use the convoy to 
hide behind, and if you are behind the 
convoy, the other side cannot fire. The 
government used convoys for physical 
cover to move and to find if an areas 
is safe and, if so, they ask others to 
come and join. Before they change 















































67 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February. pp. 24-5. Human Rights Watch cites one source 
saying the Sri Lankan army (SLA) had used the convoy on 
December 29 to advance its position and that “long lines of 











Expats were not there for the distribu-
tion of food September to December 
2008. Feedback from colleagues says 
that on the list of beneficiaries given 
by the GA [Government Authority] 
sometimes the same name was there 
two times… Colleagues said there was 
not a real monitoring of the distribution 
and some IDPs didn’t receive food they 
were entitled to. It was remote control 
with problems. Some part of the food 
was taken by the LTTE. In the last few 
weeks, I heard the LTTE take first what 
they want, the rest is distributed to the 
population… Before, it was more si-
phoning off some of what people got. 
I’m not saying it’s better to stop. Peo-






Donors were resisting sending in food 
without international supervision. WFP 
sided with the government. WFP be-
lieved that food should go in. The gov-
ernment was saying it wouldn’t allow 
international staff to be in the conflict 
area. The loss of international supervi-
sion was not a drawback at all. Rapid 
monitoring confirmed several times 
that people received food and received 
their fair share.





















We were no longer able to go to Kilino-
chchi, so we opened a corridor to Oud-
dusuddan. The convoy went only to 
PTK [Puthukkudiyiruppu]. From the end 
of January 2009, it was no longer pos-
sible… When the military were pushing 
the LTTE to coastal areas, there were 
no more WFP convoys… They al-
lowed vessels by sea. The government 
doesn’t want people to see the devas-









68 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 3.
69 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 5.



































71 WFP News Release, “Sea route opened for WFP relief food 
deliveries to Sri Lanka,” 27 February 2009.
72 WFP News Release, “WFP Dispatches another 1000 tons 
of food to the Vanni,” Rome, 2 April 2009.
73 USAID, “Sri Lanka — Complex Emergency, Fact sheet 4, 
fiscal year 2009,” citing figures for 1 April.
74 Text at “UN expert on IDPs tells LTTE to free all 




75 See, for example, John Holmes, “Let them decide,” 8 April 
2009.


































412,784,	Trincomalee	807,024 .	Table	10,	p .	51 .80	
76 ICG, 2009, “Crisis in Sri Lanka,” April 20. An ICG report of 
9 March, “Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka,” noted, “Independent 
estimates from sources on the ground and satellite imagery 
suggest at least 150,000 people are trapped by the LTTE and 
the Sri Lankan military….” OCHA reported that, as of 8 April, 
more than 7,500 patients and relatives were evacuated from 
Mullaitivu district by boat.
77 WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 2.
78 WFP News Release, “WFP Dispatches another 1000 tons 
of food to the Vanni,” Rome, 2 April 2009.
79 WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1. 
80 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based 
on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 51. The report 



































need support with livelihood protection as their coping 
strategies are depleting in Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, 
Vavuniya and Trincomalee.” (WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food 
Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security 
and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, 
June, p. 50).
81 WFP, “Budget Increases to Protracted Relief and Recovery 
Operations — Sri Lanka 10067.1,” Projects for Executive 
Board Approval, Agenda item 9, Executive Board, Second 
Regular Session, Rome, 22-26 October 2007, p. 5.
82 Reported in November, cited in Human Rights Watch, 
2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of 
Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 24.
83 USAID, “Sri Lanka — Complex Emergency, Fact sheet 4, 
fiscal year 2009,” 10 April 2009.







































84 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 4.
85 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 23.
86 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 











Almost the entire people from all AGA 
Divisions of the District are displaced. 
The IDPs of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi 
and parts of Vavuniya, Mannar and 
Jaffna Districts are now staying in Mul-
laitivu District… The population of 
Mullaitivu District at present is about 
81,000 families, consisting of about 
330,000 persons… The required food 
items for the issue of Dry Ration under 
WFP have not been transported to the 
district. Only a few MT of food items 
were brought by ships and were issued 
to the IDPs. There is a severe shortage 
for food in the area. People are unable 
to purchase the food in the market. 
Prices of the food items have increased 
and vegetables and fruits are not avail-














87 Situation Report of Mullaitivu District by Addl. Govt. 
Agent, Mr K. Parthipan, 7 March 2009.
88 Situation Report of Mullaitivu District by Addl. Govt. 
Agent, Mr K. Parthipan, 7 March 2009.






























An example of data that was use-
ful — OCHA implemented it with full 
WFP cooperation — was detailing 
the amount that went it the Vanni. 
We could say only a small amount 
went it and could do advocacy. But it 
depends on the population. Then the 
government says it’s only 70,000 odd. 
It was partly to show the food was ad-
equate and partly to show there were 
not many Tamils and they were not a 
force to be reckoned with. The GAs 
in Mullativu and Kilinochchi had 350-
370,000 figures. But Colombo was say-
ing they’re compromised by the LTTE. 
There are incentives to ask for more. 









































89 A WFP report noted at end-March, “Since late January, 
nearly 52,000 IDPs have crossed over to government 
controlled areas and are accommodated in IDP centres/
welfare villages: Vavuniya (44,823), Jaffna (4,861), Mannar 
(856), Trincomalee (464) and Pulumudai hospital (957)” (WFP, 
Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1).













































90 Human Rights Watch Letter to IMF Executive Directors on 







In Vavuniya, the people say they are 
leaving because of, one, shelling, and, 
two, hunger. It’s the same thing on 
medicines — the government has a 
longstanding policy of not allowing 
antibiotics, ostensibly because they 
wouldn’t want it to fall into LTTE hands 













































If people knew that there was ICRC or 
other international agency waiting for 
them on the other side, thousands, 
virtually all of them, would have run 
for safety, even if it meant breaking 
through LTTE cordons. But risking your 
life to end up in government detention 






















91 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February, p. 28.
92 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 







You have masons, bakers, competent 
people. But the Sri Lankan govern-
ment will not allow any agencies to 
employ people from the camps. They 
say they’re sending them to techni-
cal school to teach them a trade, but 
many already have a trade. If they want 
bread, give them an oven to make it or 
bricks to make an oven!... They don’t 
let you work with IDPs, forming com-




















People are being discharged from 
Vavuniya hospital who shouldn’t be, 
and they’re being discharged into 
camps… C-sections [cesarian sections] 
are normal in this country, but women 
are being discharged after three days 
— there’s so much risk of infection… 
There’s no list of patients. People just 
93 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009.
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disappear from the hospital and you 




We could have been better prepared 
to face the emergency. WFP, the gov-
ernment, the NGO community — get-
ting ready as a coordinated effort was 
neglected. WFP staff were preoccupied 
with supplying food to the no fire zone. 
The government figure [for those who 
would come out] was very low, maybe 
























94 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy 
(ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org). On 
these disappearances, see for example International Crisis 
Group, 2009, “Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri 
Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province,” 16 April.
95 NRC Sri Lanka, April 2009, in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 6.
There isn’t a thorough screening proc-
ess. If there was a thoughtful and clear 
procedure, for example in Omanthei, 
then we’d be in a much better position 
to negotiate for freedom of movement 
— not necessarily full resettlement but 
for example day passes and some abil-
ity to leave the camps. So long as that 
screening is not done properly, they 
can say they need restrictions on the 
camps. Being able to achieve anything 
in these circumstances is very difficult.
Along	similar	lines,	a	UN	worker	noted	in	
April:	
The screening process doesn’t exist in 
any sense that it has an end-point… 
You need to check, but show us that 
system! People are sitting under sur-
veillance for a year. If there was screen-
ing, one single person could say I am 
a combatant or not. That hasn’t hap-
pened. It justifies detaining 200,000 
people96 on the grounds that they are 
a security threat. We bought the line 



















96 Subsequently, the number rose significantly.








In September 2008, the Sri Lankan 
authorities informed the UN and 
humanitarian organizations that they 
were in the process of drawing up 
contingency plans to keep up to 
200,000 displaced people from the 
Vanni in new camps in Vavuniya dis-





















It’s a protection emergency. They have 
interned the entire civilian population 
that’s come out of the Vanni, saying 
there are security reasons for not hav-
97 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 17.
98 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 17. 
ing freedom of movement. Security 
is such a big factor. They wouldn’t 
allocate land to us. We are finding our-


















Since September last year [that is, 
September 2008], agencies were told 
they need to leave the Vanni. The gov-
ernment said we will bring everyone 
to Vavuniya and it was saying there 
are only 70,000 there [in the Vanni]. 
They said the UN was exaggerating 
[the numbers] and that LTTE is always 
exaggerating to get more resources. 
Since then [September 2008], we are 
starting to prepare. We try to discour-
age displacement so as not to create 
a city so people will come, but we at 
least try to get land, clear the land. 
We’ve been saying this since Septem-
ber. The consequences now are no 
draining, no toilets, last night it rained 
[in Vavuniya], no road, the ground is 
not level. The first people were com-
ing in November 2008. It’s not like 
there hasn’t been warning.
99 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 11.




CIMIC [Sri Lanka’s Civil Military Coop-
eration unit] said there were 432,000 
citizens in the Vanni. This was in Octo-
ber-November 2008. There were some 
losses of life. Perhaps 370,000 were left 
in the Vanni late November, 365,000 
with those who went to Jaffna. The 
army agreed — 400,000 was written 
on the whiteboard [that is, the military 
whiteboard] in November 2008, I saw 
it. Now the army has been saying a 
maximum of 70,000. There’s been no 
census in the Vanni since 1983. Some 
of our esteemed colleagues took the 
70,000 figure too much, didn’t question 




























































Given mass internment, people’s abil-
ity to supplement is very restricted, 
except if they bribe soldiers, who are 
not too much on the make [that is, not 
much inclined to take bribes]. There are 
150,000 you need to fully support. WFP 
is providing a basic food basket, but 
the food may be culturally inappropri-
ate, a lack of variety, or not tasty. The 
government has always had a policy of 
100 Sanjana Hattotuwa, 2009, “Cartography of shame,” 
Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, 17 May.
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giving cooked meals. This emergency 
has been going three months and 
they are still doing communal cook-
ing. It doesn’t allow decisions on who 
eats first in a family. It’s very clear that 
the most vulnerable are finding it dif-
ficult to access food in the camps. A 
woman with a 20-day-old baby — if I 
have no family members, it’s necessary 
to go and wait in line and scuffle and 
try to get my food, so I’ll miss meals 
regularly. The are no separate lines or 
cooking areas for the most vulnerable. 
The government has reliable registra-
tion data. They have data on women 
with small children etc., but they don’t 
share with WFP or UNHCR. Coopera-
tion with the government is very poor... 
Pregnant women are also vulnerable, 
and the elderly. They don’t have the 
stamina, with months of not having ac-
cess to food in the Vanni, they are very 
weak, dehydrated. There are recorded 













101 One local NGO worker said the quality of the dahl 
provided was very low and that it would have been more 
culturally appropriate to provide unpolished brown rice than 
white rice. 
102 Human Rights Watch noted: “… the humanitarian plight 
of the Vanni displaced population has greatly concerned 
neighbouring India, with a large Tamil population in Tamil 
Nadu state; lowering the figures of affected persons may be 
an attempt to limit Indian pressure.” (Human Rights Watch, 
2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of 































































In Sri Lanka, we’ve seen some IDPs in 
camps for many years. There’s currently 
a caseload under SO1 of 433,000 peo-
ple. Many IDPs are in camps for a year 
or more, so they’re not meeting the US 
government definition of an emergen-
cy. Many can’t go home because of the 
government and when that’s the case, 
it’s not incumbent on the international 
community to feed them. It’s up to the 
government… The UN ought to be 
working with the government for a real-
istic resettlement strategy. In February 
2009, the government said 80 per cent 
would go home by end-2009. It’s clear 
now that that’s not going to happen. 
Now is the time the government can 
and should develop a returns strategy 




103 A Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) report noted, “Two 
camps at Kalimoddai and Sirikundel in Mannar have been 
in existence since March 2008, and house approximately 
900 IDPs, only a small fraction of whom have been allowed 
to leave permanently. To leave, they have to obtain a pass 
for a specific purpose from the army and have a family 
member act as guarantor.” (CPA, “A profile of human rights 
and humanitarian issues in the Vanni and Vavuniya,” March 
2009, 40, cited IDMC [International Displacement Monitoring 
Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing 

































104 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 9. The displaced in 
Puttalam have been receiving rations from WFP and the 
government. There has been some local integration; but the 
government resists this, saying the displaced will one day 
return to their homes (p. 9). 
105 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 1.
106 IDMC commented, “In the Eastern Province, where there 
had been massive displacement in 2006 and 2007, almost all 
the IDPs had returned to their areas of origin, with exceptions 
including those whose land had been designated as a High 
Security Zone by the government.” (IDMC [International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 1). 
























The government is planning to keep 
the people in the area for more than 
three years. The reasons? First, you 
can destroy the financial capacity of 
the Tamils. Second. If they have no 
purchasing power, they have to get 
out and lose our education and lose 
strong children and have malnour-
ished children. Our total generation 
will be spoiled, and you can treat thee 
guys as slaves. Third, the opportunity 
to bring all the wealth from the Vanni, 
timber, coconuts, we can abandon 
our area… The sea is our big re-
source, pearl in the Mussali area. In 
future, they can do resettlement for 
Sinhalese families. In Mannar most of 
107 See also Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief 
Services, 2009, “Urgent Relief Programme for the People of 
Vanni,” January.
108 Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, 
2009, “Urgent Relief Programme for the People of Vanni,” 
January.
the area was cleared [that is, of LTTE] in 
2006, but they still did not do any re-
settlement [of the displaced] in almost 
two years. You can easily do mine clear-




































109 On the importance of the north as the “rice basket” of Sri 
Lanka, see WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, 
Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 9; and WFP, Internal situation 
report, March 27 2009, p. 1.
110 See also Sanjana Hattotuwa, “Cartography of shame,” 17 
May 2009, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo.
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Donors have no faith in the handling 
of IDPs and protection issues are not 
being addressed. Donors want settle-
ments to be temporary and a roadmap 
to the IDPs’ return. The government 
has no roadmap. Defence people say it 








260,000 are being kept in camps. It’s 
internment and not acceptable. The 
screening process is unending… It’s 
very difficult to predict what numbers 
will be in camps by the end of the year. 
The government is not willing to share 
any schedule. The monsoon rains are 
fast approaching and we fear that we 
will not be able to prevent an impend-
ing disaster…111 Relieving the conges-
tion in the camps is still not happening 
on a large scale. Even those who are 
taken out are still kept in temporary 
camps in their districts rather than be-
ing released to their relations or friends, 
as claimed by the government. We are 
asked to food these people in these 
new camps and we do not have resourc-








111 The possibility of major disease outbreaks was stressed 
by other local NGO workers. One said in September 2009, 
“We are facing the monsoon. When the rain comes, the water 
systems will all get clogged. The water purification system 
can’t handle it.” 











































112 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy 
(ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org).
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113 Hugo Slim, 1997, “Doing the Right Thing: Relief 
Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in 






















In June 2003 donors pledged US $4.5 
billion in reconstruction aid for the “en-
tire” country, but only the (unspecified) 
amount destined for the war-shattered 
northeast was made conditional on 
“progress” in the peace process. 
Outside these pledges, bilateral and 
multilateral aid to the state continued… 
By not recognising that rising violence 
was a cycle of retaliation between army-
backed paramilitaries and the LTTE, 
international actors denounced the 
latter’s intransigence and saw the state 
as tolerant and applied sanctions and 
incentives accordingly. Indeed, LTTE 
protests that violence was sustained by 
ongoing state support for paramilitaries 
in contravention of the CFA [Ceasefire 
Agreement] were not taken seriously by 
the international community until late 
2006, long after the shadow war had 
become open (if undeclared) war.114
114 Suthaharan Nadarajah, “Prejudice, asymmetry and 
insecurity,” Conciliation Resources, London, p. 1-2 (http://
www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/incentives/asymmetry.php).
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One	local	UN	worker	recalled:	
There were lots of conditions for agen-
cies to work after the east was liber-
ated. That’s when the state saw how 
far it could push. NGOs were told they 
have to do provision of services and 
not human rights work… If one agency 







We should have had a bigger protest 
when the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
was asked to leave [in January 2008]. 
They were monitoring the ceasefire. 
Nobody did anything, and after a while 
I think the Sri Lanka government got 
very bold because nobody was stand-












No, they [the government] have the 
support of the Americans, the Pakista-
nis and the Indians for their strategy. 
The Americans wanted to avoid civilian 
casualties — they pushed to allow the 
humanitarian corridors to go in, but 




I was surprised and shocked it was 
so easy. It took only a few days. Local 
staff started working for the GA [Gov-
ernment Authority] as volunteers and 
then civil servants. I don’t understand 
why it was so easy to tell everyone 
to leave. Some expats were really 
upset at headquarters in Colombo, 

























There’s a different level of negotia-
tion that actually becomes begging. 
There’s a need for stronger advocacy 
at all levels. We say, “No, we can-
not be searched.” You protest, then 
you accept. You are a Catholic and a 
Protestant at the same time! First the 
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and	academics	will	work	out	whether	it	was	cor-
rect .”	A	third	UN	worker	said:	
There are very few opportunities to 
look back and say “We confronted, 
and it didn’t work.” We’re told we have 
no leverage. I don’t know if that’s true. 
It gets taken from us, and we accept. 
It’s different from saying, “We tried 
other strategies and they failed.” Over-
whelmingly, we decided at all costs to 
stay engaged. It hasn’t worked. It hasn’t 
helped us to protect IDPs and it hasn’t 





I was working in the east. There were 
forced returns of refugees from Bat-
ticaloa to Trincomalee.115 UNHCR was 
releasing protection information in a 
very controlled way, in bed with the 
government. People were getting 
beaten onto buses, separated. Informa-
tion did get out there, for example via 
OCHA, forcing UNHCR to come out 
with a strong statement. From then on, 
the way returns happened was so much 










115 An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) report 
(“Sri Lanka Fact Sheet — Batticaloa District,” 22 March 2007) 
noted: “Despite Government assurances that all return 
movements will be voluntary, interagency monitoring reports 
indicate that heavy pressure has been applied on IDPs, 
including local authority statements that assistance will be 






























They [the government] tried to abolish 
the cluster system. They basically de-
cide what to do, and nobody stands up 
to them. They play the PNG [persona	
non	grata] game. Two CARE people 
were just PNG’d, one had been in the 
country for four years. They had a lot of 
institutional memory. They [the govern-












There are certain parameters — the 
idea that you must not give in to inter-
national pressure to stop the war, which 
partly has happened before. In the 
1990s, there were so many human rights 
violations in the counterinsurgency that 
it limited the state’s ability to crush the 
insurgency. A paradigm shift now, so 
you use propaganda and state resourc-
es to get support for the war. You have 
an organisation that can hold onto the 
objective of finishing the business. The 
army is not going to rebel — the Presi-














The attempt to hold a special session 
of the HRC [UN Human Rights Council] 
was on for four weeks. Those driving 
the move wanted to hold it when the 
war was on, and they pushed for it to 
be held on May 14th. They wanted to 
put the international brakes on our final 
offensive. In short they wanted to save 
the Tigers. We thwarted that exercise 
and bought the time and space for our 
armed forces to finish the job.116
116 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Stand up for others, they stand 







When the BP-100 was locked up [the 
vehicle transporti ng these high-energy 
biscuits was detained at Medovach-
chiya], the government accused 
UNICEF of feeding the Tigers to make 
“Supertigers.” Is this not something to 
stand up and refute?117 I feel like it’s got 
progressively worse to the point where 
[Defence Minister] Gotabaya Rajapakse 
can say ridiculous things like not one 
person has been killed in our “humani-
tarian operation.” We’ve made them 
believe there is total impunity. They’ve 
started to believe their own figures. 
We’ve been saying it’s not 70,000 [the 
total number of people in the Vanni]… 
They are in trouble. The situation is go-














117 A statement from the UN Office of the Resident/
Humanitarian Coordinator noted, “The United Nations 
deplores that such life saving items, destined for severely 
malnourished children, were diverted from their intended 
purpose” (UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian 
Coordinator, “UN Sri Lanka Statement,” 10 March 2009, 
Colombo.)
118 On these, see for example International Press Freedom 
and Freedom of Expression Mission to Sri Lanka, 2008, 
“Media under fire: Press freedom lockout in Sri Lanka,” 
December (http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_sri_Lanka.
pdf).


















The government is not very coopera-
tive on getting an objective baseline. 
UNICEF did a nutritional assessment 
more than a month ago, and when I ask 
I am told “We’re still finalising and talk-
ing with the government.” We could 
say we will not provide food unless we 
can provide nutritional data with results 
that can be public. They don’t want to 
release nutritional data because they 
don’t want to be accused of having 










119 Renuka Jayatissa, 2009, Rapid Assessment of Nutritional 
Status Among Displaced Population in Vavuniya, Medical 
Research Institute, Colombo.
120 AFP, “Quarter of displaced Sri Lankan children 
malnourished,” 11 April 2009, in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 

















There are probably more than 1,000 
children killed in the war since Janu-
ary 2009. We don’t hear that. The 
UN spoke on underage recruitment, 
which was not verified, but not on child 
deaths. It compromised our neutral-
ity a great deal… It was not helpful to 
have the UN back away from casualty 
figures, 4,500. If the UN speaks out on 
this, it is only going to be embarrassed 
by the scale of the error in the other 
direction in a year’s time. It became 
embarrassing for ICRC to come out 
and speak about casualties because 
no-one else would, so the UN said a 
bit more… Our ability to verify that 
[child recruitment] was much less than 
our ability to verify child deaths. The 
UN had names, addresses and eve-
rything… It was dragged into making 




121 Statements on child deaths during the final stages of the 
war and on conditions in the government-run camps seem to 
have contributed to the expulsion of UNICEF’s James Elder 
by the Sri Lankan government in September 2009 (Randeep 
Ramesh, “Sri Lanka expels UN official who criticised camps,” 
Guardian, 6 September 2009).
122 David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: 
Polity. 



































123 For example, a WFP press release noted on 27 February 
2009: “… most displaced persons are now concentrated in a 
new safe zone along the eastern coastline of Mullaitivu district 
(WFP News Release, “Sea route opened for WFP relief food 
deliveries to Sri Lanka,” 27 February 2009).
124 UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, Sri 
Lanka, “UN Sri Lanka statement,” 19 February 2009.
125 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February, p. 13.
126 ICG, “Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka,” 9 March 2009.
127 USAID, “Complex Emergency Fact Sheet no. 4,” 10 
April 2009, in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring 
Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing 








Despite the government’s April 2 an-
nouncement that the military had been 
ordered to cease using air attacks, artil-
lery, and other heavy weapons against 
remaining LTTE-held areas, such at-
tacks have carried on with increasing 
intensity…the government has default-
ed on its promises and paid mere lip 
service to calls for restraint, all the while 













While the Security Forces accept all 
responsibility to ensure the safety and 
protection of civilians in the Safety 
Zones, they are unable to give such 
an assurance to those who remain 
outside these zones. Therefore, the 
government, with full responsibil-
128 OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN), 13 March 2009, cited in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, pp. 5-6.
129 AP, “UN says nearly 6,500 civilians killed in Sri Lanka,” 
24 April 2009, cited in IDMC (International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict 
facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 5-6.
130 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy 
(ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org).
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ity, urges all civilians to come to the 
Safety Zones; and also states that as 
civilians who do not heed this call will 
be among LTTE cadres, the Security 
Forces will not be able to accept re-











A figure of 2,500 civilian deaths in the 
no fire zone — we got Tamil press fig-
ures checked against health workers’ 
figures. But the humanitarian coordina-
tor, under pressure, said he can’t verify 
the figures. It’s probably over 4,000 
already a few months back. But a state-
ment about child recruitment came 







Opportunities for leverage are very 
small. Data is seen as key, but you can 
always turn it round and question the 
sources. Sometimes data can backfire, 
as when a WFP guy said the situation 
was worse than Somalia.132 If you ex-
pose the casualty figures, it can raise 
131 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February. 
132 It appears that a WFP representative in the north said 
on BBC Sinhala news service that the situation was as bad as 
Somalia; WFP later issued an apology.
the alarm but it can also backfire, un-
less you can back it up 100 per cent of 
the way. There’s a process of counter-
claim and counter-counterclaim and 
then people get bored of it — and 



















At the national level, we are working 
with IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Com-
mittee], now the humanitarian team, 
Vanni group, CHA [Consortium of Hu-
manitarian Agencies]. We coordinate 
with each other. It’s become very hard. 
We had what was called “the coffee 
club.” The reason it was called that was 
to demonstrate informality of NGOs 
working in the north. After the Tsunami, 
it was whittled away but then became 
quite important again. It makes its way 
to the media, seen as elitist, a “crème 
de la crème” international NGOs group 
scheming against the government.
In	a	context	where	many	international	
agencies	have	been	wary	of	being	seen	to	sup-
133 On the Tsunami response, see in particular Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition, 2006, “Joint Evaluation of the 
International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.” 
















The government has really taken on the 
NGOs, castigating them. It’s front-page 
news if any aid agency vehicle is found 
to be used by the LTTE, or equipment 
donated. NGOs have been browbeat-
en and scared and some were asked to 
leave. But the government is also quite 
ruthless with donors — the German 
ambassador, the Norwegian ambas-
sador, the [Sri Lankan] Foreign Ministry 
has done dressing down sessions.
One	diplomat	recalled:	
An underlying theme is the feeling 
that international NGOs in the north 
and east have been tools of the LTTE. 
The LTTE decided who could work 
where and there were LTTE people 
inside the NGOs, and this is partly cor-
rect because the international NGOs 
needed some kind of understanding 
with the LTTE. The government fright-
ens, singles out organisations and 
individuals — for example, UNICEF, 
Norway, the US — depending on the 
issue. It’s craftily and skilfully done and 
they avoid collective efforts on various 
issues. Another technique is to start 
with very extreme demands and shake 
up what’s possible. The proposed 
MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] 
agreement, for example, you shift your 
perception of what is possible. If you 






UNHCR has quite a lot of influence, 
from experience in the east. Negotia-
tions here can’t be done on the basis 
of demands. It was something UNHCR 
learned in the east, making demands 
for IDPs in the east and the government 
just shoots it down. These lessons are 
embodied in the aide memoire and 
guidance notes for the north. The gov-
ernment has genuine concerns around 
security… It’s about picking your battles. 
The government is incredibly sensi-
tive about being criticised and losing 
face. Any criticism and the government 
just turns it round and blames some-
one else… One helpful thing is the 
UNHCR scorecard, part of an ongoing 
evaluation. What’s good is it’s saying to 
government, “These are what we have 
achieved and this is the gap that still 
remains.” With protection, the space 
for negotiation is a lot slimmer. The 
most success in terms of negotiation is 
less formal and public. Anything that’s 
thrown out publicly, the government will 
react in a certain way. The JVP, JHU, NFF 
[National Freedom Front], the national-
ist groups, can criticise the government. 
The government had to rely on their 
support to win the last election… The 
government doesn’t like it when, in their 
words, we go running to our ambassa-
dors and chase up on issues… It’s about 
being sparing with your political capital, 
for example if the ambassador is running 
to the government every time there’s a 
problem, it becomes ineffective.





















There are tensions between interna-
tional and national NGOs. There are 
some very well established entities in 
this country. Some local NGOs have 
very good connections to top leaders 
and in international organisations we 
tend to go like a bull in a china shop 
— and when national agencies are 
trying to negotiate, it becomes dif-


























































134 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 11.























In many places [within Sri Lanka], the 
international community fails to raise 
their voices. One reason is working 
permits will be cancelled or they will be 
named a “white tiger” [that is, a white 
supporter of the LTTE rebels]. Plus, 




135 Randeep Ramesh, “Sri Lanka expels UN official who 
criticised camps,” Guardian, September 6 2009.
136 Randolph Kent and Ken Wilson have both stressed how 
a concern with organisational health and growth can create a 
bias towards measurable and visible solutions to measurable 
and visible problems, including a bias towards shifting physical 
commodities to people once they have become thin in 
environments that can be easily monitored and publicised. 
See, for example, Randolph Kent, 1987, Anatomy of Disaster 
Relief: The International Network in Action. London: Pinter 
Publishers; Ken Wilson, 1992. “A State of the Art Review of 
Research on Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees 
from and in Mozambique.” Stockholm: Swedish International 
Development Authority; David Keen and Ken Wilson, 1994, 
“Engaging with violence,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi 
(eds.) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses 


























The only leverage is much higher up. 
I don’t think we’ve been clever in ne-
gotiating… I don’t think anyone thinks 
Sri Lanka is important. You just have to 
compare injuries and deaths to Gaza. 
It’s been a forgotten catastrophe, 
partly because of the restrictions on 
journalism. But if it was seen as impor-
tant, the journalists would have been 
pressing to come and have access.
A	local	NGO	worker	commented	in	Sep-
tember	2009:	
We do not know what the WFP/UN 
policy is on these new camps… In 
terms of advocacy, I think the UN as a 
whole should take a tougher stand at 
Headquarters level and continue to 
express its displeasure over the contin-
ued detention of IDPs… This can’t go 
on — it’s against international law and 
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everything else. On your own, individual 
agencies can’t do much advocacy. The 
government is very strong and popular 
and controls the media… The sad real-
ity is that larger geo-political realities 
(China, India, Pakistan, Iran) give the 
government of Sri Lanka unprecedented 
freedom to act with impunity and disre-
gard international humanitarian law.
A	Local	UN	worker	commented:	
There is value in using the human rights 
framework, including the Supreme 
Court. UN agencies and the humanitar-
ian community need a common posi-
tion. There’s been no common position 
on when emergency funding should end 
or whether to support the centres hous-
ing ex-combatants… The problem is not 
having a coherent stand on an issue and 
not coordinating with the UN stance as a 
whole. If the state knows it can play one 
agency off against another, what’s the 
leverage?... Within agencies, I don’t think 
there is a push for a common stand.”
Somewhat	similarly,	a	local	NGO		
worker	said:	
The UN Resident Representative wasn’t 
able to get a common position on Manic 
Farm from a human rights framework. 
There has to be a lead from the UN 
Resident Representative and his team, 
supported by New York and Geneva… 
There’ve been a lot of missions — John 
Holmes, Walter Kaelin, but have they 
really made a difference?... Many do 
not realise that by funding internment 









































… anyone who has read Noam Chom-
sky on Kosovo will know the pernicious 
role played by sections of the western 
media in artificially creating the im-
pression of a humanitarian crisis which 
provided the smokescreen for interven-
tion. These media you speak of are the 
very same that tried to convince the 
world that Iraq possessed weapons of 
mass destruction!137 
137 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Stand up for others, they stand 
up for you,” interview in Waani Operation, 3 June 2009 
[wannioperation.com].


















It’s mainstream to say humanitarian 
actors have no leverage. I disagree. 
They are implementing operations and 
have advocacy tools and mandates. 
WFP is not known for its large advo-
cacy approach. But it’s part of the UN 
family. We see WFP not as a technical 
implementer of food on behalf of the 
government, which is taking credit for 
it and winning elections, but the PRRO 
[Protracted Relief and Recovery Opera-
tion], which is currently running for two 
years, is a non-adequate instrument to 
deal with the current humanitarian cri-
sis. We’ve told WFP this since October 
2007. You have a mandate, you’re part 
of a family. You cannot reduce your-
self to logistics! We understand the 
humanitarian imperative of bringing in 
the food now overrules. But from the 
beginning, there were problems of ac-
cess and insufficient attempts to moni-
tor and control distribution because 
the government said “We’ll take care 
of it.”… The system did not work before 
the influx [the mass influx into Vavu-
niya]. The system was not functioning 
before… The government continues to 
use the argument, “It’s under the PRRO 
and we distribute.” They’ve used this 
politically to say, “‘We did the distribu-
tion.”… We need to keep emergency 
at three months. WFP is raising money 
for 20 months for the emergency under 
the PRRO, saying it ensures the pipe-





If we had an EMOP [Emergency Op-
erations Programme], you would still 
have to work with the government. A 
PRRO allows you multi-year flexibility. 
You’re not confined to 12 months. If 
conflict re-escalates, you can switch to 






There is New York. There are other 
levels [of the UN]. We have reacted a 
bit late. In late 2008, the government 
didn’t want assistance in the Vanni. 
They saw it as interfering with the war 
operation. The humanitarian commu-
nity was ordered out of Vanni. WFP was 
allowed, not others… Then we asked, 
“Would you consider international 
monitors.” The first reaction was “no,” 
and then “yes.” Just before he left [that 
is before leaving his post as WFP coun-
try director], [Mohamed] Saleheen felt 






The MOU [Memorandum of Under-
standing] with the government left 
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WFP in a difficult situation. WFP was 
not making a fuss about the fact that 
the food going into the Vanni was not 
sufficient. From February 2008 was 
probably the last time a full ration 
went in for the IDPs. It was probably 
around 50 per cent after that. It was 
kept a secret. It was felt that a better 













Although the government is trying 
to maintain a normal level of health 
services in the conflict affected areas 
in the North and East, this can not be 
achieved due to the destruction of 
health facilities in a number of areas 
and the lack of qualified medical per-
sonnel. Virtually everyone in the Vanni 
area suffers form inadequate medical 
and educational services due to the 
conflict-imposed embargo.139 
According	to	Human	Rights	Watch:
At a December 10, 2008, Inter-Agen-
cies Standing Committee (IASC) meet-
ing, WFP officials estimated that the 
food deliveries into the Vanni since the 
September 2008 withdrawal had been 
38 percent below the minimum nutri-
138 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based 
on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 38. 
139 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based 
on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 37.
tional requirements, but this estimate 
was based on an estimate of 200,000 
IDPs, which is lower than the 230,000 
number used by other UN agencies, 
and also uses the date of the first con-
voy, October 2, as the starting date for 
its needs assessment, ignoring the fact 
that no food deliveries were made in 
September. Because of this, the WFP 
figures underestimate the actual food 





























140 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 28. Human Rights Watch (p. 27) acknowledges 
some food stocks in the Vanni at the time the government 
ordered the humanitarian withdrawal. 
141 WFP, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 
10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda 
item 8, 27-30 October, p. 3.





We need from our UN partners trans-
parency, admitting there are obstacles 
and problems. The system as pre-
sented on paper is not the reality. It’s 
not helpful if these elements remain 
hidden — the protection environment, 


















What, [the Bosnians] asked, was the 
point in feeding us but not protecting 
us? So we can die on a full stomach? 
There was much truth to this: the main 
humanitarian problem in Sarajevo was 
not a lack of decent food but a surplus 





142 Maass, Peter, 1996, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War, 
London and Basingstoke: Papermac, p. 30.
143 See, for example, David Keen, 2008, The Benefits 
of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in 
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first 










































144 ICG, 2004, “Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur,” p. 13. 
145 Mark Duffield, 2001, Global Governance and the New 
Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: 
Zed Books. Michael Ignantieff noted this perception in 
Afghanistan in his 1998 book The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic 
War and the Modern Conscience, New York: Henry Holt.









































146 WFP, Internal situation report, 27 March 2009, p. 1.
147 Aid workers in Darfur have stressed how bureaucratic 
obstructions took time and attention from a range of other 
issues, notably protection issues.


























From a protection perspective, WFP 
needs to be fully in the protection dia-
logue in Colombo. They do come to 
meetings, but we need more action on 
food from a rights perspective… Food, 
it’s been pushed very hard, with hours 
of negotiating, including senior diplo-
mats in Colombo. So it’s isolated from 
other humanitarian issues, and from 
protection issues in particular. There is 
scope to use the issue of food more in 
terms of pressuring the government. 
The government is entirely reliant on a 
149 See, for example, Alex de Waal, 1997, Famine Crimes: 
Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: 
James Currey.
150 While there does seem to have been a desire on the 
government’s part to use food to influence population 
movements, one senior UN worker felt there was an awareness 
that food was not the only factor here: “Yes, the military 
probably would say ‘Separate the civilians and use food aid’, 
and they put a lot of obstacles in our way. But there was also 
some recognition that civilian movements were also being 
shaped by the LTTE, so it was not all about food.”
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daily basis on the international food… 










Protection is a very sensitive thing. It 
should be taken over by UNHCR, that’s 
their mandate. WFP is a service organi-
sation. They shouldn’t take protection 
as a main them, but as a cross-cutting 
issue. If WFP takes that as one theme, 
the government will listen and talk. If 
they [WFP] emphasise protection too 






















The food’s value to the government is 
substantial. It saves a lot of money for 
them… The economy has rapidly de-
teriorated over the last six months — a 
costly war and the international finan-
cial crisis and loss of tourism, and de-
mand for textiles and rubber is down, 
remittances are down (including Tamil). 
The government has decided to go to 
the IMF having shut off the IMF a few 











I’m still having doubt why the interna-
tional community cannot make pres-
sure, like economic barriers [sanctions] 
for Sudan. We are not challenging the 
government calling it a “humanitarian 
war.” It’s actually not. Yesterday around 
400-500 people died in the no fire 
zone… They shoot and shell with multi-
barrage. Every day they killed at least 
200 people.
One	UN	worker	observed:	
It’s easy to place the argument at 
the end of the spectrum, saying “Is it 
about walking away?”… IDPs are still 
in camps, two high security camps 
in Mannar are around a year old. We 
failed them… Nothings changed. It’s 
just more people… When we had 
space to negotiate, we weren’t doing 
it. There were small numbers coming 
into Vavuniya last year [2008], Novem-
ber, December and January 2009. The 
151 See, for example, transcript of a press briefing by 
Caroline Atkinson, Director, External Relations, International 
Monetary Fund, 21 May 2009 (http://www.imf.org/external/
np/tr/2009/tr052109.htm).
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government could have met needs at 
that time if we’d withdrawn. Now they 
couldn’t afford to. It’s been played 
really nicely… We have to fill gaps at 
100,000 and didn’t have to at 20,000. 
It’s not a poor country.
Another	aid	worker	echoed	this	analysis:	
Pressure should have started much ear-
lier, at the time when we had to leave 
the Vanni. Pressure from the UN was 
not enough. Now if you say we stop the 
food today, it’s very hard to pressure. 
With this amount of people, it’s too 
late. In September 2008 or in February 
this year, more should have been done.
One	UN	worker	asked:	
Have there ever been consequences 
for the state in terms of how it be-
haved? They started to shell hospitals 
and health care locations, each shifting 
to makeshift facilities. Nothing in the 
vicinity was retuning fire. Plus, limit-
ing medical aid that did go in [to the 
Vanni]. It was fundamentally eroding 




As long as the Security Council doesn’t 
see a threat to international security, 
as long as there’s no willingness to im-
pose sanctions, nothing will change… 
Short of serious sanctions, there’s noth-
ing we can do. The EU is playing with 
GSP plus [an updated Generalised Sys-
tem of Preferences] trade concessions. 
But it has had no effect, in my view.  
The state says it’s willing to take the 
loss. The IMF loan is coming up. 
There’s a possibility of restrictions. It’s 
to be decided 10 May. There’s no sign 
of the state getting more accommodat-
ing, though there may be some con-
cessions in the two days before 10 May. 





















If you don’t get assistance from the US, 
Iran can come in and offer an oil deal. 
If not the UK, then China is happy to 
provide. Japan is ever ready to help the 
country economically. Arab countries 
are ready to come in. India does scare 










152 David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: 
Polity.
153 Georg Frerks and Bart Klem, 2006, Conditioning 
Peace among Protagonists: A Study into the use of Peace 
Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process. The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
154 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
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com)	(subtitle:	“Strengthening	the	hands	of	
brave	soldiers”):
… President Mahinda’s support for 
Palestine (He’s President of Palestine 
Association if Sri Lanka) has won the 
hearts of Arab Leaders (at the cost of 
Israel), resulting in all Arab Countries 
such as Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan 













The government has launched a mas-
sive development drive while prosecut-
ing a war against the most ruthless and 
powerful terrorist outfit in the world. 
The government has not reduced wel-
fare programmes or subsidies. This is 
the only government that has launched 
five port development projects, four 
power generation projects, reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation of thousands of 
kilometres or rural and urban roads, 
four express ways and hundreds of 
other development projects simultane-







155 Sandun Jayasekera, “President offers to rehabilitate 
Prabha,” Daily Mirror, 21 April 2009.









































The LTTE has lost a conventional war 
and probably will never come back and 
157 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
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have territorial control. But that does 
not mean they are out of the equation, 
for example as an exile movement with 
the diaspora controlling, and the ability 























The LTTE is resurgent in Batticaloa 
and Ampara, different cells hiding and 
coming up. It’s far, far from over. In the 
east they can use Karuna… Now peo-
ple feel less secure than when the LTTE 
was there. There are lots of abductions, 
extortions, white vans — people feel 
very, very insecure in the east. We need 
pressure from the international com-
munity — what sort of governance is 
going to be put in place?
Many	were	pessimistic	here .	A	local	aid	
worker	observed:	
158 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
159 WFP Press Release, “WFP urges aid for forgotten victims 
of strife in Sri Lanka,” 28 February 2002.
The war won’t be over. If they give a 
political solution, it can be. But they 
didn’t give before. Do you think they 
will give it now? The [Tamil] bargain-
ing position is zero. Another group will 
come and the LTTE will also be strong. 
The way the government is treating the 





We have not solved the problem. We 
have militarily defeated the armed 
group. But all the factors that led to 
this conflict are still there… Even the 
opportunities for reconciliation, the 
government is not using them. We are 
heading for a big disaster, not rebellion 
soon because the Tamils will be very 
passive and Tamil politicians will be 
compliant. But the government is still 
not sending any message to the Tamil 
community that they are equal citizens, 
especially confining them in camps. 
There has not been a significant move 










Violence, political instability and the 
government’s reluctance to devolve 
power or resources to the fledgling 
provincial council are undermining am-
bitious plans for developing Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province… Despite the pres-
160 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
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ence of tens of thousands of soldiers 
and police in the east, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have 
proven able to launch attacks on gov-
ernment forces and on their rivals in the 
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP). 
There have also been violent conflicts 
between different factions of the pro-
government TMVP, and impunity for kill-
ings and disappearances, many of them 
apparently committed by government 
security forces and/or their allies in the 
TMVP. Extortion and criminality linked 






Yes, there won’t be big concessions… 
The Tamil civilian population, in the first 
year you will have people back on their 
feet and back to their original place, with 
rehabilitation and gradual development 
of some kind of Tamil polity, trying to 
implement the thirteenth amendment 
[governing the powers of provincial coun-
cils]. If there’s a minimal interpretation of 
this, it’s almost useless… The pessimistic 
scenario is the government will do as 
they have done in the east, put in lead-
ers and ministers with almost no support 
from the Tamils, and disappearances, 
killings of those who raise their voices… 
The population is so fed up with war, no 
willingness to take up arms, so you don’t 
have to do much to avoid big problems 
in the next 5-10 years. Plus, the northern 
Tamils detest the LTTE. Colombo Tamils 
might be more positive, and have only 
161 ICG, 2009, Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri 
Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province, 16 April, Executive 
Summary, p. 1.
162 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
the experience of suffering at the hands 
of the government, while the northern 





The biggest lever we will have is to 
help Sri Lanka with reconstruction and 
we must demand a legitimate political 
process in the north and a restoration of 
democracy and a state where minorities 
have a rightful place. It’s appropriate to 
say, “Show us what you’re planning to do. 
If we do not like it, we cannot fund it.” 
The problem now is we are confronted 
with a humanitarian imperative, and the 
government is so fixed on winning the 
war that they don’t have resources for 
saving lives. There will be a better oppor-





















163 Asanga Welikala, 2008, “A State of Permanent Crisis: 
Constitutional Government, Fundamental Rights and States 
of Emergency in Sri Lanka,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
Colombo.






































164 Asanga Welikala, 2008, “A State of Permanent Crisis: 
Constitutional Government, Fundamental Rights and States 
of Emergency in Sri Lanka,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
Colombo, p. 237. Mark Duffield drawn attention to the 
paradoxical existence of “permanent emergencies.”
165 The Sipri Military Expenditure Database, 2009, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (http://milexdata.sipri.
org/result.php4). These figures are adjusted to keep the value 












































166 This might also extend to leverage over the question of 
“war crimes,” which has recently come to prominence.
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Number 4: Emboldening the 
Government
When	it	came	to	advocacy,	exerting	early	












































Number 5: Openness on Shortcomings 





































Number 6: Advocacy as a Way to 
Enhance “Humanitarian Space”—  
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The limits of Humanitarian action: WfP, food assistance  
and International aid in DR Congo
James Darcy, Overseas Development Institute




























168 The ToR for the case study are included in an Appendix.
169 The authors would like to thank all those who gave their 
time to contribute to the study. In particular they would like 
to thank the staff of WFP in Rome, Kinshasa and Goma for 
organising and hosting the visit during such a busy period. We 
hope the result will be found useful and worthwhile.
Case study: DR Congo (Field visit, May 2009)



























































170 The country was known as “Belgian Congo” prior to 
independence in 1960
171 These figures and the basis on which they were derived 
are much debated. The primary source is the surveys 
conducted on behalf of IRC between […, Roberts, L. et al)]. 
For a recent review of the debate between the relevant 
experts, see the recent HNTS peer review paper which casts 
some doubt on the high mortality estimates from the IRC 
surveys.



























































































173 A French acronym for Mission de l’Organisation des 





























Defining Vulnerability and Aid 
Priorities in DRC












174 Source: OECD DAC








































































































































175 For a full “baseline” analysis of food security in 
DRC, see the WFP Comprehensive Food Security and 
































In the course of the 59 nutritional studies 
undertaken in the DRC between January 
and August [2008], 28 nutritional emergen-
cies were identified (acute malnutrition 
rate above 5%), including a majority in the 
western provinces. This distribution shows 
that while acute malnutrition in the conflict 
zones must be closely monitored, it is also 
important to take into account the zones af-
fected by chronic food insecurity in the west-
ern provinces. The results … [indicate] a 
similar level of vulnerability to acute [nu-
trition] crises in all parts of the country, 
including the capital. [emphasis	added]






















WFP PRRO (10608.0): Targeted Food 






















“WFP’s logistics in DRC are complex and costly 
because of the size of the country, the poor 
state of roads, air, river and rail communica-
tions, the numerous supply corridors and the 
distances between them and the shortage of 
reliable transporters. WFP’s intervention areas 
are generally remote; the limited capacity of the 















i)	The impact of mass displacement on 
food security:	“Looting and chronic insecurity 
have caused major population movements and 
prevented those who stayed behind from pro-
ducing food. An optimistic scenario assumes that 
populations will return, but the situation is still 
precarious in the Ituri, Katanga and Maniema tri-
angle. The ratio of displaced people to returnees 








ii)	Food availability and access. Despite	
DRC’s	“enormous	agricultural	potential,”	crop	
176 Average internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) 
costs for the project are given as US$353.49/mt in the PRRO.
























iii)	Household access to food, lifestyles 




with	host	populations .	“In most cases they lack 
access to land and subsist by selling labour or 
gathering wild foods. Displaced groups live in 















iv)	Nutrition, food and health. The	2006	
joint	mission	found	that	“at the national level, 
global acute malnutrition is 13 percent; stunting 
is 38 percent, but there are major differences 
between regions. The joint mission noted that 
extreme poverty restricts households’ access 
to food and is a major cause of the high rate of 
malnutrition. Access to food is limited in terms 
of quantity and quality: 30 percent of the popu-
lation eat one meal a day or less; 60 percent eat 
no more than two meals a day. Meals are gener-
ally the same and consist of cassava or corn.”
On	the	health	situation,	the	report	notes	
that	“The rate of maternal mortality is among the 
highest in the world — 1,000 deaths per 100,000 
live births. The main causes of morbidity and 
mortality are malaria, acute respiratory infections, 
tuberculosis (TB), diarrhoea and malnutrition.” 
In	addition	to	poor	general	public	health,	
the	report	notes	that	“women and children are 
regularly exposed to sexual abuse by soldiers. 
This contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
prevalence of which reaches 4.5 percent — 20 
percent among women subjected to sexual 
abuse; 400,000 people affected by HIV/AIDS 
need medical care and nutritional support. DRC 
currently has 3 million orphans and abandoned 












The International Humanitarian 
Response in DRC
“There are few places on earth where the 
gap between humanitarian needs and avail-
able resources is as large — or as lethal — as in 
Congo” (Jan Egeland, former UN ERC). 














Humanitarian action is effective when it 
responds to basic needs at the outset of a cri-
sis. However, it is not very appropriate during 
the prolongation of the crisis, particularly if the 
beneficiaries are displaced people living within 
a host community or in isolated sites. The 
humanitarian actors have noted an increasing 
need to:
a. Strengthen the traditional coping mecha-
nisms of the Congolese populations, par-
ticularly for host communities in charge of 
displaced people;
b. Limit the dependency on humanitarian aid 
and favour durable solutions by providing 
beneficiaries with the means to progres-




failure	to	address	root	causes .	“To confront 
this situation, and eventually reduce humani-
tarian aid in the DRC, the actors hope:
a. To strengthen the capacities of the af-
fected communities to confront new crises 
through actions beyond emergency aid;
b. To establish, in collaboration with the 
development actors, an early warning 
mechanism facilitating the identification 
of communities likely to be affected by 
177 See for example “Sur quelle base? Document de 
reflexion, Oxfam RDC” 2009 which critiques current 
approaches as being based on criteria other than need, 
resulting in distortions and a failure to address urgent needs 
in areas other than those affected by conflict.
humanitarian crises, and humanitarian or 
development aid to prevent them;
c. Advocate with the Congolese government 
and the development actors in favour of 
reorienting the microeconomic devel-
opment programmes towards the crisis 
zones, which hamper sustainable develop-
ment.”
The	HAP	therefore	includes	two	new	
strategies	for	2009 .	“The first is the restoration 
of livelihoods of the populations and com-
munities in crisis situations, essentially through 
activities linked to food security, which allow 
the victims to take charge of themselves. The 
second is short term community recovery, 
including a multi sector strategy of post or 
pre crisis actions, complementing the micro-
economic development programmes. Without 
results with regard to these objectives, the 
humanitarian actors will have to remain indefi-
























178 See Harvey and Lind, 2006 — ODI
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same	text)	to	eventually reduce humanitarian 






















































































Strategic and Operational 
Challenges of Operating in DRC

















































































179 Subsequent enquiries indicate that this is not general 
practice, and is not a policy endorsed by either MONUC or 
WFP. The comment cited should be read in this context.
180 See Oxfam paper “Sur quelle base?” cited above













engagement and support for peace-building 
in the Congo at least through the 2011 elec-
tions needs to be maintained… with a view to 
implementing a roadmap that defines precisely 
the role and responsibility of each partner and 
the benchmarks to be met so that the process 
becomes irreversible. Only then should the 

























































“In collaboration with the Government and 
implementing partners, and principally under 
the food security cluster, WFP will develop strat-
egies to preserve forest cover while increasing 
production and managing soils and water sus-
tainably.”	(2007	PRRO)





























of	engagement	for	protection .	“During the 
October-November 2008 crisis in North Kivu, 
when a humanitarian catastrophe threatened in 
and around Goma, robust political engagement 
with national and regional actors did more than 


















182 Although the figures for excess mortality given by the 
IRC surveys (cited above) are disputed, most agree that large 
numbers of people have died as an indirect consequence of 
the war, principally through disease and malnutrition. 







































The international community expects 
that the situation will gradually stabilize 
and that returning populations will need 
assistance to resettle. The Government 
will have to enhance all available mecha-
nisms to consolidate the peace and pro-
mote sound governance and sustainable 
development. It will need to embark on 
reconstruction programmes to enable 
people to access social services such as 
health, education and transport and to 
resume their normal activities.
In the worst-case scenario, conflict 
would continue in the east, with the risk 
of entire regions being involved. Vol-
canic eruptions, drought and floods are 
also a source of concern …
The current PRRO is based on an op-
timistic scenario involving progressive 
improvement in institutional capacities. 
The worst-case scenario will be consid-
ered in re-examining the planning of 
emergency operations (EMOPs).
On	this	basis,	WFP	sees	its	basic	role	as	
being	to	respond to emergencies and organ-
ize recovery activities, giving priority support to 
internally displaced people and returnees…	The 
operation will focus on areas at risk of serious 
food insecurity, particularly in the east and Ka-
tanga. WFP has closed several of its sub-offices 
in the areas less affected by food insecurity and 



















183 Afghanistan is another notable example of this tendency 
towards unrealistic scenario planning.
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The	risk	assessment	for	the	PRRO	acknowl-
edges	the	potential	for	things	not	to	go	ac-
cording	to	plan .	The	operation	“will be imple-
mented after the new institutions arising out of 
the 2006 elections are established. Any political 
blockage would undermine national unity and 
lead to a resurgence of hostilities. Fresh popu-
lation movements would take place and ac-
cess to target populations would be reduced. 
Benefits stemming from WFP interventions 
would be jeopardized, especially the return 













would	be	reassessed:	In the event of large-scale 
resumption of hostilities and consequent limita-
tion of humanitarian work, WFP will refocus its 
assistance on populations directly affected by 
the situation; vulnerable groups and malnour-
ished people will be treated in nutritional cen-
tres…In addition to life-saving interventions, the 
other components — FFW, emergency school 






















































184 Serious concerns were raised in interviews about the 
quality of the data (about malnutrition, market prices, etc) 
being generated from these sites. One respondent described 
it as “very low quality data, very unreliable.”
185 One respondent said, “We are not honest enough about 
what we actually deliver.”
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Review of WfP’s Responses to operational and 
Programming Challenges in Conflicts and Complex 
emergencies: a Case study of Haiti
Thomas Gurtner, Consultant 
Executive Summary
Of Haiti’s 9 million people 60 percent reside in towns, of whom half live in slums; 55 
percent live below the poverty line of US$1 per day. A severely degraded environ-
ment, frequent hurricanes, decades of poor governance, poor market infrastructure, 
small and fragmented landholdings and lack of health and agriculture extension ser-
vices are all factors that exacerbate poverty and vulnerability. Food security, health 
and nutrition are extremely precarious in many areas, and critical in some places.186 






























Case study: Haiti (Field visit, June 2009)




























186 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
WFP.


















































































































































































































The Humanitarian and 
Development Environment 






























































































































The United Nations System and 
Integrated Mission






























































188 According to Médecins sans frontières (MSF), gunshot 
casualties referred to their hospital in Port-au-Prince fell from 








































The United Nations Country Team 












































189 It has taken UNDP several years to produce a 
comprehensive framework that engages donors in a 
coordinated strategic approach. The Government’s leadership 
weakness and bilateral donor agendas have made this 
approach difficult. Today the ten top donors — the EU, 
the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, CIDA, USAID, Spanish 
Development Cooperation, French Development Cooperation 
and the ABC group — sit on a joint steering committee 
chaired by the Resident Coordinator; technical work is carried 
out through sector and sub-sector groups with a view to 











































International NGOs and the International 
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Max	G .	Beauvoir	 Grand Maître, Le Peristyle de Mariani
Government services
Pierre-Louis	Pinchinat	 	Directeur adjoint, Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités 
Territoriales, direction de la protection civile
Roosevelt	Confrère	 Coordinateur prevention aux désastres, direction de la 
 protection civile
Marjorie	Charles	 National	expert	in	disaster	management	(UNDP)
Alex	Ceus	 	Coordinateur de la rehabilitation de l’environment, Ministère de la 
Planification, Les Gonaives
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Annex 1. Partial List of Interlocutors – continued
Donors
Martin	Weiersmüller	 	Coordinateur, direction du development et de la cooperation, 
Confédération Suisse
Dennis	B .	McCarthy	 	Office	 chief,	 Food	 Security	 and	 Humanitarian	 Assistance	 Office,	
USAID,	Haiti
Marie	Flore	Cadet		 	Deputy	 office	 chief,	 Food	 Security	 and	 Humanitarian	 Assistance	
Office,	USAID,	Haiti
Damien	Berrendorf	 Head	of	Mission,	ECHO,	Haiti
Jan	Jakobiec	 Deuxième secrétaire, Coopération Canadienne (CIDA)
Ambassador	 Brazil
Rose-Luce	Cadot-Prevot	 Disaster	Risk	Management	Specialist,	USAID
Annex 2. Literature Consulted
Call,	C .T .	2009 .	United Nations Peace Operations and State Building: a Case Study of Haiti .	New	York,	
New	York	University	Centre	on	International	Cooperation .
Collier,	P .	2008 .	Haiti: from Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security: a Report for the Secretary-
General of the United Nations .	New	York .
Government	of	Haiti .	2008 .	Rapport d’évaluation des besoins après désastre: cyclones Fay, Gustav 
et Ike .	Port-au	Prince .
Government	of	Haiti .	2007 .	PRSP:	Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la réduction 
de la pauvreté .	Port-au-Prince,	Ministry	of	Planning	and	External	Cooperation .
ICG .	2008 .	Reforming Haiti’s Security Sector .	Latin	America	Caribbean	Report	no .	28 .	Port-au-Prince .
ICG .	2009 .	Haiti: Stability at Risk .	Latin	America	and	Caribbean	briefing	no	19 .	Port-au-Prince .	
Schwendinger,	K .	2008 .	Coordination des partenaires techniques et financiers en Haiti .	RSSGA .	
WFP .	2009 .	Haiti Executive Brief .	Rome .
WFP .	2008 .	Emergency	Operation	10781 .0 .	Rome .
WFP .	2008 .	Development	Project	10386 .0 .	Rome .
WFP .	2009 .	Programme Formulation Support Mission, Haiti PRRO .	Rome,	OMXD .
WFP .	2007 .	Evaluation	Report:	PRRO	103382 .	Rome .	
UNDP .	2009 .	The Decline of Remittances .	Crisis	update	no .	4 . Panama	City, Regional	Bureau	for	Latin	
America	and	the	Caribbean,	Cluster	for	Poverty,	Human	Development	and	MDGs .	
United	Nations .	2009 .	Haiti	UNDAF	(2009–2011) .	New	York .
Conférence sur le développement économique et social d’ Haiti .	Washington	DC,	14	April	2009 .
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23Rd June Arrival Of Participants (All Day)
 Welcome drinks and snacks available at the Gazebo from 16:00 to 19:00
24Th June Day 1
08:30	–	09:00	 Registration and Welcome Coffee
 Venue: San Francesco Room & San Bernardo Room
09:00	–	09:15 Opening Address
 Venue: San Francesco Room
 Ramiro Lopes Da Silva (Conference Chair)
	 WFP	Deputy	Chief	Operating	Officer	and	Director	of	Emergencies
09:15	–	09 .30	 Introduction of the Conference Objectives and Programme
 Venue: San Francesco Room
 Nicholas Crawford and Thomas Gurtner
	 Overall	Conference	Facilitators
Part I: Overview on Theory and Trends
09:30	–	10:30  Conflict, Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Assistance:
Theory and Trends
 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Session	Chair:	 Mark Duffield (University of Bristol)
	 Panelists:	 James Darcy (ODI), David Keen (LSE),
  Fabrice Weissman (MSF)
10:30	–	11:15 Open Floor Discussion 
11:	15	–	11:30	 Coffee Break
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
11:30	–	12:15	 From Theory to Practice: Findings from the Field
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
 Session	Chair: Lauren Landis (WFP)
	 Panelists:	 Thomas Gurtner –	Findings	from	WFP	studies
   Abbas Gullet (KRCS) –	National	humanitarian	organisations	in	
conflict
  Dominik Stillhart	(ICRC) –	Principled	humanitarian	action
   Peter Goossens (WFP) – Complex	emergencies/protracted	crisis	
perspective
12:15	–	13:00 Open Floor Discussion
13:00	–	14:15 Lunch at the Gazebo
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Part II: Critical Areas of Engagement and Operational Effectiveness
14:15	–	14:30	 Introduction to the Plenary on Critical Areas of Engagement
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Plenary	Chair: Ramiro Lopes Da Silva
14:30	–	16:00 Critical Areas of Engagement – Simultaneous Fora for Debate 
	  Forum 1 – States, UN/Integrated Missions and Impact on Humanitarian 
Space
	 Venue: Beata Gabriella Room (Convent Side)
	 Facilitator:	 Jean-Luc Siblot (UNDOCO)
	 Presenters:	 David Harland (UNDPKO)
	 	 Antonio Donini (Tufts University)
 Rapporteur:	 Mohammed Haider Reza (UNMAC-Afghanistan)
	 Forum 2 – Non-State Actors, Security and Impact on Humanitarian Space
	 Venue: Bottegal Room (Convent Side) 
	 Facilitator:	 Mustafa Darboe (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Hussein Halane (SCF), Khaled Mansour (UN)
 Rapporteur:	 Corinne Fleischer (WFP)
	  Forum 3 – Protection, the Rights Agenda, Principled Humanitarian Action, 
and Advocacy
	 Venue: Capella Room (Convent Side)
	 Facilitator:	 Gemmo Lodesani (WFP)
	 Presenters:		 Liam Mahony (Fieldview Solutions)
	 	 Christine Knudsen (UNICEF)
	 Rapporteur:	 Bruno Lemarquis (UNDP) 
16:00	–	16:30	 Tea Break
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
16:30	–	17:45 Feedback to Plenary by Rapporteurs and Open Floor Discussion 
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
18:00	–	19:00 Welcome Reception at the Gardens and the Gazebo
25Th June Day 2
09:00	–	09:05 Introduction to Day 2 Programme
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Overall	Facilitators:	Nicholas Crawford/Thomas Gurtner
09:05	–	09:15 Introduction on the Plenary of Operational Effectiveness
	 Venue:	 San	Francesco	Room
	 Plenary	Chair:	 Ramiro Lopes da Silva
09:15	–	10:30 Simultaneous Fora for Debate on Operational Effectiveness
	  Forum 1 – Understanding and Reaching Out Effectively to Local 
Communities
	 Venue: Beata Gabriella Room (Convent Side) 
	 Facilitator:	 Zlatan Milisic (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Jemilah Mahmood (Mercy Malaysia)
	 	 Margaret Vogt (UNDPA)
	 Rapporteur:	 Claude Jibidar (WFP)
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	  Forum 2 – Challenges to Effective Programming (1): Planning, preparedness 
and rapid response
	 Venue: Bottegal Room
	 Facilitator:	 Myrta Kaulard (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Rashid Khalikov (OCHA), Carlos Veloso (WFP) 
 Rapporteur:	 Giancarlo Cirri (WFP)
	  Forum 3 – Challenges to Effective Programming (2): Protracted Crisis, 
Sustainability and Exit
	 Venue: Capella Room (Convent Side) 
	 Facilitator:	 Mohammed Diab (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Luca Alinovi (FAO), Barbara Boyle-Saidi (ICRC)
	 Rapporteur:	 Al Kehler (WFP)
10:30	–	10:45		 Coffee Break 
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
10:45	–	11:30 Feedback to Plenary by Rapporteurs and Open Floor Discussion
	 Venue:	 San	Francesco	Room
11:30	—	12:15	 	Plenary Presentation: Drivers of Conflict and Future Challenges to 
Humanitarian Assistance
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Session	Chair:	 Laurent Thomas (FAO)
	 Panelists:	 Elisabeth Rasmusson (NRC)
	 	 Adil Najam (Boston University)
  Alexander Downes (Duke University)
12:15	–	13:15 Open Floor Discussion
13:15	–	14:45	 Lunchtime Dialogue with WFP Executive Director Ms Josette Sheeran
 At the Gazebo
Part III: Summary, Next Steps and Closing
14:45	–	16:00	 	Highlights of Findings: Brief thematic presentations drawn from the 
conference
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Plenary	Chair:	 Ramiro Lopes da Silva
16:00	–	16:15	 Tea Break
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
16:15	–	17:15  Consolidation and Presentation of Key Recommendations for Moving 
Forward
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Plenary	Chair:	 Ramiro Lopes da Silva
17:15	–	17:30	 Closing Remarks by the Conference Chair
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